

....  
.... [—————]  
—————] never had anyone in position to tell us what was going to happen in advance, or even where Bin Ladin was going to be in advance [—————]  
—————] we never knew where he was going to be in advance, And usually we were only informed about his – where he was after the fact. . . . And [—————]  
where they were able to tell us where they thought he was at the moment, [—————] the CIA itself recommended against action, because they said their sources were not very good, or not good enough to recommend military action].

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Former Director Louis Freeh emphasized the critical difference that human sources and adequate “infiltration” of terrorist organizations could have made in the context of the September 11 attacks:

If one of those 19 hijackers had spoken – maybe they did, maybe we don’t know about it yet – incautiously or imprudently to someone in some place where that information could have been captured, we could have had a day of terror prevented instead of September 11<sup>th</sup>. There’s all kinds of possibilities there. So, infiltration. We need to have our agents sitting around wherever they were sitting around in Hamburg and the U.A.E. and other places, as well as in the caves over in Afghanistan so we can know what is going on.

[Lacking access to senior, high level al-Qa’ida leadership, the Community relied on secondhand, fragmented and often questionable human intelligence information, a great deal of which was obtained from volunteers or sources obtained through the efforts of foreign liaison].

[According to senior CTC officials, CIA had no penetrations of al-Qa’ida’s leadership and never obtained intelligence that was sufficient for action against Usama Bin Ladin from anyone. A large number of current and former CTC officers indicated that CTC had numerous unilateral sources outside the leadership who were reporting on al-Qa’ida, and a larger number who were being developed for recruitment, prior to September 11. The best source was handled jointly by CIA and the FBI. In addition, CIA managed a network of [—————] in Afghanistan that often reported information regarding Bin Ladin issues and relations with the Taliban. They occasionally provided threat information as well, but had no access to al-Qa’ida’s leadership].