

_____].

Several other Arab governments hesitated to share information gleaned from arrests of suspects in the *USS Cole* bombing and other attacks. Even several European governments were described to the Joint Inquiry as indifferent to the threat al-Qa'ida posed prior to September 11, while others faced legal restrictions that impeded their ability to share intelligence with the United States or to disrupt terrorist cells. Prior to September 11, for example, [_____], despite repeated requests from CIA, [Page 118] provided little helpful information [_____]. A CIA representative described the situation in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry:

We had passed [_____] a great number of leads about al-Qa'ida members. We passed [them] a great deal of leads on al-Qa'ida members, including some of the people you see in the press now, like [_____] _____], and we had really given them a lot of names to track after September 11. The arrests they made [after September 11, 2001] showed that they had in fact been following them and monitoring them to some extent. But the CIA did not get information back [_____] on it to any measurable extent that would help us with our efforts.

[CIA's liaison partners vary in competence and commitment. [_____]

_____]. However, the Agency still had to rely heavily on liaison partners in several countries in order to acquire counterterrorism intelligence for the conduct of other counterterrorism activities].

There were also missteps in the efforts of various Intelligence Community agencies to develop foreign liaison relationships. [_____]

_____]. However, significant problems arose because liaison on counterterrorism was not always well integrated into overall U.S. regional goals and