

network, be added to the Department of State watchlist for denying entry to the United States.

- In late summer, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a person associated with al-Qa'ida was considering terrorist operations in the United States. There was no information as to the timing or possible targets.
- On September 10, NSA intercepted two communications [—————] suggesting imminent terrorist activity. These communications were not translated [page 215] into English and disseminated until September 12. They were not specific, and it is unclear whether they referred to the September 11 attacks.

During the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community also disseminated information to a wide range of senior government officials at all federal agencies and military commands about the potential for imminent terrorist attacks. For example:

- On June 25, the Intelligence Community issued a terrorist threat advisory warning government agencies that there was a high probability of an imminent “spectacular” terrorist attack resulting in numerous casualties against U.S. interests abroad by Sunni extremists associated with al-Qa'ida.
- Subsequently, intelligence information provided to [—————] senior government leaders on June 30 indicated that Bin Ladin's organization expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties.
- [A briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July asserted: “Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning].”