

personnel to go around and that CTC was already well supplied with staff compared to other CIA divisions.

A former Chief of the CTC unit dedicated to Bin Ladin also told us, in a judgment confirmed by his successor:

We never had enough officers from the Directorate of Operations. The officers we had were greatly overworked. . . . We also received marginal analytic support from the Directorate of Intelligence. . . .

In particular, a CIA officer commented on the reasons for the CIA's failure to follow through on information about two September 11 hijackers who came to the attention of the Intelligence Community in January 2000:

How could these misses have occurred?... The CIA operators focused on the Malaysia meeting [the hijackers attended]; when it was over, they focused on other, more urgent operations against threats real or assessed. Of the many people involved, no one detected that the data generated by this operation crossed a reporting threshold, or, if they did, they assumed that the reporting requirement had been met elsewhere. . . . They are the kinds of misses that happen when people – even very competent, dedicated people such as the [page 252] CIA officers and FBI agents and analysts involved in all aspects of this story – are simply overwhelmed.

On September 12, 2002, there was a substantial infusion of personnel into the CTC. No comparable shift of resources occurred in December 1998 after the DCI's declaration of war, in December 1999 during the Millennium crisis, or in October 2000 after the attack on *USS Cole*. In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, DCI George Tenet asserted, "In hindsight, I wish I had said, 'Let's take the whole enterprise down,' and put 500 more people there sooner." It is noteworthy that the DCI's comments were limited to the CIA and did not encompass the resources of other agencies within the Intelligence Community.

In response to questions about efforts to obtain additional counterterrorism resources, DCI Tenet described to the Joint Inquiry his inability, before September 11, to generate necessary support within the Executive Branch:

[I would ask every] year in [the] budget submission . . . I'm not talking about the Committee. I'm talking about the front end at OMB and the hurdle you have to get through to fully fund what we thought we needed to do the job. Senator Kyl once asked me "How much money are you short?" "I'm short \$900 million to \$1 billion every year for the next five years" is what I answered. And we told that to