

General Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff's current Director of Operations pointed to two additional constraints on military operations against Bin Ladin. The first was the absence of "actionable" intelligence on Bin Ladin's whereabouts: the Intelligence Community never provided a location and time at which a missile strike could be launched. The second was the absence of a declaration of war or some similar declaration indicating that the Taliban was a formal enemy. In General Shelton's view, the absence of such a declaration precluded the United States from sending U.S. soldiers into Afghanistan to capture or kill Bin Ladin. He believes that solving the Afghanistan problem before September 11 required the full range of diplomatic, economic, and military tools available to the U.S. Government.

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In contrast, the Chief of CTC's Bin Ladin unit through June 1999, told the Joint Inquiry:

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A former CTC Chief had a somewhat different view of intelligence support to the military during his tenure [\_\_\_\_\_]:

[The military has] exacting criteria that intelligence needs, that needs to be met before they can launch an operation. [\_\_\_\_\_  
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Another Chief of CTC's Bin Ladin unit had yet another view on actionable intelligence:

I think our swift victory . . . after September 11<sup>th</sup> – underscores the fact that we had an enormous body of actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's terrorist infrastructure. [\_\_\_\_\_  
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**D. CIA Covert Action Against Bin Ladin [ ]**