

E. Link to al-Qa'ida Discovered

The Intelligence Community was not sure of KSM's alliances until after [———]. For example, a December 1995 CIA cable stated, "As far as we know, Yousef and his [page 329] confederates – such as [KSM] – are not allied with an organized terrorist group and cannot readily call upon such an organized unit to execute retaliatory strikes against the U.S. or countries that have cooperated with the U.S. in the extradition of Yousef and his associates."

[This assessment changed in 1996 when a foreign government shared information that Bin Ladin and KSM had traveled together to a foreign country the previous year. In August 1998, after the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, another foreign government sent CIA a list of the names of individuals who flew into Nairobi before the attack. Based on information delivered by another liaison service, CIA recognized that one of the passengers' names was an alias for KSM. The liaison report also described KSM as close to Bin Ladin. In an interview, the FBI agent responsible for the KSM case could not remember this information, even though it had been disseminated by CIA. This information and subsequent reporting led the CIA to see KSM as part of Bin Ladin's organization. Several CIA cables indicated that following up on information relevant to KSM was essential, given his past activities and his links to al-Qa'ida].

F. The Emphasis on Renditions

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