

Concerns about protecting criminal prosecutions also limited the FBI's ability to utilize strategic analytic products. In interviews, some analysts said they frequently were told not to produce written analyses, lest they be included in discovery during criminal prosecutions. FBI analysts were further hindered because of the limitations of the FBI's information technology.

The Bureau has had little success in building a strategic analytic capability, despite numerous attempts before September 11 to do so. For example, in 1996, the FBI hired approximately 50 strategic analysts, many with advanced degrees. Most of those analysts left the Bureau within two years because they were dissatisfied with the role of strategic analysis at the FBI.

CTC analysts also expressed concern that their opinions were not given sufficient weight. A CTC manager confirmed that CIA operations officers in the field resented tasks from analysts because they did not like to take direction from the Directorate of Intelligence. Despite the need for increased analytic capability, CTC reportedly refused to accept analytic support from other agencies in at least two instances before September 11. Both FAA and DIA informed the Joint Inquiry that CTC management rebuffed offers of analytic assistance because the agencies wanted in return greater access to CTC intelligence, particularly intelligence about CIA operations.

NSA analysts told Joint Inquiry staff that the CTC viewed them as subordinate, like an "ATM" for signals intelligence. The analysts attempted to accommodate CTC requests for information by focusing on short-term operational requirements, sometimes at the expense of more thorough analysis, even changing reporting formats because CTC did not like NSA analyst comments to be embedded in the text of the reports. Several NSA analysts also stated their belief that the DCI will always side with the CIA's CTC operational personnel over NSA analysts in the event of agency disagreements.

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## **B. Analyst Qualifications and Training**

The Joint Inquiry explored the extent to which analysts were inexperienced, undertrained, and, in some cases, unqualified for the responsibilities they were given. At the CTC, analysts were a relatively junior group before September 11 with three years experience on the average, in