

additional capabilities that made them particularly effective against the al-Qa'ida target. The DCI, the senior leadership of the CTC, and the leadership of the Directorate of Operations were actively engaged in building and maintaining these liaison relationships.

Developing relationships with liaison services paid off handsomely when there was some actionable intelligence about a terrorist or a cell. For example, in July 2001, a Bin Ladin operative was arrested in the [—————]. Because of this arrest, a plot to bomb an American Embassy in Europe was thwarted.

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[The liaison relationship worked extremely well with the [———], as well as with other services in the [—————]. Liaison sources often provided valuable information about the al-Qa'ida network, but the CIA could not rely on them to provide access to Bin Ladin's leadership. Moreover, in other parts of the world, abdicating collection to foreign partners meant the CIA obtained precious little information. According to one U.S. Government official, if liaison services did not want to help, for example in certain Western countries, there was little that could be done, by CIA].

B. DIA Human Intelligence Collection

[DIA's Defense HUMINT Service also plays a role in clandestine collection, though on a much smaller scale than CIA. According to General Dayton, the Director of DHS, after the Embassy bombings DHS "got excited" about Bin Ladin and al Qa'ida. They searched their old agent files and reestablished contact with [——] sources that could help them with terrorist targets. [—————] former highly placed agents were reactivated. Prior to September 11, at any one time, DHS had [—————] active. Based on those sources they produced several hundred intelligence reports from fall 1998 to September 2001.

Most of the DHS sources were focused on [—————] and had little direct reporting capability against [—————]. DHS characterized its [—————] sources as well placed and extremely useful in the post-September 11 air campaign targeting effort. [—————]
