

Germany.²⁰ Today, similar debates continue as it becomes clear that the sort of sophisticated pattern-analysis and semi- or fully-automated “data-mining” capabilities that will be necessary for intelligence analysis to keep up with complex transnational threats such as those presented by Usama bin Laden’s Al-Qa’ida organization are not compatible with traditional notions of Intelligence Community secrecy and restrictions upon access based upon an outsider’s “need to know” as determined by the agency information-holders themselves.

A. *The Intelligence Community’s Failure to “Connect the Dots” Prior to 9/11*

The most fundamental problem identified by the JIS is our Intelligence Community’s inability to “connect the dots” available to it before September 11, 2001 about terrorists’ interest in attacking symbolic American targets. Despite a climax of concern during the summer of 2001 about imminent attacks by Al-Qa’ida upon U.S. targets, the Intelligence Community (IC) failed to understand the various bits and pieces of information it possessed – about terrorists’ interest in using aircraft as weapons,²¹ about their efforts to train pilots at U.S. flight schools,²² about the

²⁰ See, e.g., F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), at 86; John Winton, *ULTRA At Sea* (New York: Morrow & Co., 1988), at 148; Patrick Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939-1945* (London: Greenhill, 2000), 89, 98-100, 189-90, & 279; David Kohlen, “F-21 and F-211: A Fresh Look into the ‘Secret Room,’” in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Fourteenth Naval History Symposium* ed. Randy Carol Balano and Craig L. Symonds, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), at 304 & 327-29.

²¹ For an account of information available to the Intelligence Community about terrorists’ interest in using aircraft as weapons, see JIS, written statement presented to SSCI/HPSCI joint hearing (September 18, 2002), at 26-28.

²² For an account of information available about terrorists’ interest in acquiring aviation training at U.S. flight schools, see JIS, written statement presented to SSCI/HPSCI joint hearing (September 24, 2002), at 3.