

presence in the U.S. of Al-Qa'ida terrorists Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and about Zacarias' Moussaoui's training at a U.S. flight school – as being in some fashion related to each other.

As the JIS concluded, the IC failed to “connect[] these individual warning flags to each other, to the ‘drumbeat’ of threat reporting that had just occurred, or to the urgency of the ‘war’ efforts against Usama bin Laden.”²³ Having failed to make that connection, the IC was caught flat-footed when the attack finally came. Accordingly, no effort to “fix” the problems highlighted by September 11 should be taken seriously unless it attempts to address the pervasive problems of information-sharing that afflict our Intelligence Community.

(1) *Terrorist Names*

One of the serious problems identified by our Joint Inquiry is the pervasive refusal of the CIA, in the months and years before September 11, to share information about suspected terrorists with the very U.S. Government officials whose responsibility it is to keep them out of the United States: the State Department consular officials who issue visas and the INS officials who man immigration posts at every American port of entry.

As the JIS outlined in its testimony before one of our joint SSCI/HPSCI hearings, the so-called TIPOFF system provides the basic “watchlist” function by which consular and INS

²³ JIS, written statement presented to SSCI/HPSCI joint hearing (September 18, 2002), at 10.