

apparently did not find it worthy of comment that Al-Qa'ida threat warnings were at a fever pitch when Moussaoui had come to the Bureau's attention.¹³⁴ (Given the FBI's poor record of internal information-sharing, it is conceivable that the author was not even *aware* of the broader analytical context, even though he worked in the office at FBI Headquarters nominally responsible for having such awareness. At any rate, the RFU teletype certainly provided no such context.) Despite Moussaoui's specific focus upon aviation training, the RFU's teletype to the FAA on that same day also contained no analytical context that would have helped a reader understand Moussaoui's potential significance.¹³⁵

(b) *Analysis versus Investigations*

(i) *Disinterest in Analysis*

¹³⁴ JIS, written statement presented to SSCI/HPSCI joint hearing (September 24, 2002), at 18.

¹³⁵ JIS, written statement presented to SSCI/HPSCI joint hearing (September 24, 2002), at 21.