

[redacted] [redacted]. 21 Aug. [Recap: DCI eight committee briefing regarding why CIA concluded that UBL was responsible for the bombings in Africa. DCI noted large number of renditions of UBL supporters]. [redacted] [redacted] Sep. [redacted] [redacted], Abu Hajer, who is head of UBL's computer operations and weapons procurement, was arrested <i>abroad</i>. Hajer is the most senior-level UBL operative arrested to date. 18 Sep. DCI briefs members of Congress on bombings. [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]. DCI noted that the FBI is following 3 or 4 Bin Ladin operatives in the U.S.	2 Sep. DCI testimony to SSCI/HPSCI. "Key elements of CIA's offensive strategy against UBL include: hit UBL's infrastructure; work with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests; disrupt and weaken bin Ladin's businesses and finances; [redacted]; [redacted]; recruit or expose his operatives; ... pressure on the Taliban; and enhancing unilateral capability to capture him.	Sep. [Information indicates UBL has considered conducting attacks in the U.S. The near-term threat to Americans is greater in Europe, where UBL's infrastructure is better established]. [Fall 1998. [redacted] claimed that UBL's next target would possibly involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it].	Fall 1998. [Information indicates al-Qa'ida is trying to establish an operative cell within CONUS to strike at the heart of U.S. interests and [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
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