

**CIA/FBI FAILURES IN REGARD TO TWO SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS,
THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION, AND THE MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION
(BASED ON CHART PRESENTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN AT OCTOBER 17, 2002 JOINT INQUIRY HEARING)**

CIA Failures

<u>al-Mihdhar</u>	<u>Al-Hazmi</u>
1. 1/5/00 – CIA acquires Midhar’s passport information with multiple entry U.S. visa but does not watchlist him.	1. 1/9/00 – CIA has information to determine Hazmi’s full name and learns that Hazmi left Malaysia with Mihdhar on 1/8/00 but does not watchlist Hazmi. Nor does it notify the FBI about the Hazmi travel.
2. 1/8/00 – CIA does not notify FBI when it learns Mihdhar has left Malaysia and, again, does not watchlist him.	2. 1/9/00 – CIA does not check U.S. immigration records to determine whether Hazmi, like Mihdhar, has a U.S. multiple entry visa (which had been used on 4/3/99).
3. 3/5/00 – CIA Headquarters does not read cable on Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not consider likelihood that Mihdhar traveled with him. CIA does not check to determine whether Mihdhar is in the U.S. until 8/21/01 - 17 months later.	3. 3/5/00 – CIA Headquarters does not read cable noting Hazmi travel to U.S., so does not watchlist Hazmi or notify the FBI that he is in the country.
4. 1/2001 – CIA does not watchlist Mihdhar after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of <i>USS Cole</i> .	4. 1/2001 – CIA does not watchlist Hazmi after learning he was in Malaysia with Khallad, aka Tawfiq bin Attash, planner of the bombing of <i>USS Cole</i> .
5. 6/11/01 – CIA analyst at N.Y. meeting with FBI is aware of Mihdhar travel and visa information but does not pass it on to FBI because “it does not mean anything to [him]” and he does not have permission to reveal operational details.	

FBI Failures

<u>al-Mihdhar</u>	<u>al-Hazmi</u>
1. 1/5/00 – CIA notifies FBI about Malaysia meeting, but FBI does not watchlist Mihdhar.	1. 8/28/01 – After Mihdhar and Hazmi are placed on watchlist, FBI opens investigation on Mihdhar, but not Hazmi. FBI does not check whether Hazmi extended his original U.S. visa (an extension applied for on 7/12/00, and granted on 6/18/01).
2. 8/28/01 – FBI NY agent request for full criminal investigation is denied by FBI Headquarters official. Agent decries the “wall: preventing the sharing of intelligence information with criminal investigators.	

Phoenix 7/10/01 Electronic Communication

1. FBI RFU does not direct that FBI field offices establish liaisons with aviation schools around the country, as requested by the Phoenix agent who wrote the Electronic Communication.	<u>Moussaoui Investigation, August – September 2001</u> 1. FBI Headquarters and agents in Minneapolis misunderstand legal standard for obtaining a FISA order, believing they have to link Moussaoui to a “recognized foreign power.” Minneapolis wastes time and resources trying to connect Chechen rebels, which FBI did not consider a “recognized foreign power,” to al-Qa’ida.
2. FBI RFU fails to share the Phoenix Electronic Communication with other agencies prior to September 11, the FBI’s analytical unit, or any of the FBI’s field offices.	2. On August 24, CTC alerts CIA stations worldwide about Moussaoui. FBI waits until September 4 to send teletype to Intelligence Community and other government agencies, noting that Moussaoui was in custody, but not describing any particular threat, i.e., that he might be connected to a larger plot. The teletype did not recommend that addressees take action or look for additional indicators of a terrorist attack.
3. FBI’s New York field office receives the Phoenix Electronic Communication, but does not take action, although personnel there knew that al-Qa’ida had previously received flight training in the U.S.	3. FBI does not connect Moussaoui with heightened threat in Summer 2001, the Phoenix Electronic Communication, or Mihdhar and Hazmi’s entry into U.S.