

concrete. Nonetheless, perhaps due to the guidance they had received since the 1993 bombing, for the most part the people moved in an orderly manner down the stairs, helping those who needed assistance. Within 15 min of the strike, nearly all of the people below the impact floors had descended about 10 floors from their original location.

Table 2–1. Locations of occupants of WTC 1.

Time	Evacuated	Lobby to 91 st Floor	92 nd to 110 th Floor
8:46	0	7,545	1,355
9:03	1,250	6,300	1,355
9:59	6,700	850	1,355
10:28	7,450	107	1,355

Note: The numbers in the rows do not add to the estimated total of 8,900 due to rounding errors in the less certain values.

At the time, there were some survivors from the 92nd through 99th floors. Most of those who were able moved to the areas where the fires had not yet spread. Some were seen looking out from the former window spaces and even standing on the deformed structural steel. At 8:52 a.m., the first of at least 111 people was observed falling from the building.

Hundreds of people were on the floors above the impact zone. They soon realized that they were unable to go downward to get away from the smoke and heat that were building up around them. At 8:54 a.m., occupants began breaking windows to provide access to fresh air. By 9:02 a.m., 26 calls, representing hundreds of people, had been made to 9-1-1, asking for help and seeking more information about what was happening. Some of the people went toward the roof. However, there was no hope because roof evacuation was neither planned nor practical, and the exit doors to the roof were locked.

While the occupants were not advised in advance that roof evacuation was not a viable option, there was, and is, no requirement in the NYC Building Code for the roof to be accessible for emergency evacuation or rescue, and roof rescue was not contemplated in the WTC evacuation plans. Even had the roof been accessible, the helicopters could not have landed due to the severe heat and smoke.

Outside the building, a flurry of activity was beginning. Personnel of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) were several blocks away, investigating a gas leak at street level, and observed the aircraft impact. Within a minute, FDNY had notified its communications center and requested additional alarms for the WTC. A Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) unit had reported to its Police Desk that there had been an explosion with major injuries. By 8:50 a.m., the first fire engines had arrived, and an Incident Command Post had been established in the WTC 1 lobby. An Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Command was established 3 min later. More and more reports of damage, injuries, and deaths flooded the communications channels, and knowledge of the extent of the catastrophe was emerging. At 8:52 a.m., the first New York City Police Department (NYPD) aviation unit arrived to evaluate the possibility of roof rescue, but reported they were unable to land on the roof due to the heavy smoke. At 8:55 a.m., the firefighters entering WTC 1 began climbing the stairs (Figure 2–6). Their objectives were to evacuate and rescue everyone below the fires, then to cut paths through the fires and rescue all those above the fires.

At 8:59 a.m., a senior PAPD official called for evacuation of the entire WTC complex, although that call was not heard nor heeded by others. By 9:00 a.m., 66 FDNY units had been dispatched to the scene, and